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The UK is believed to hold prolific reserves of shale gas; the quality of which has been
compared and sometimes branded superior to the much successful US shale plays.
Nonetheless, after more than ten years since the 13th Onshore Licensing Round, the
fracking industry is said to have benefited from just £400 million - £500 million of
estimated investments and only one partially fracked well with yet an uncertain fate of
commercial production. This paradox motivated the current research. Based on a
discounted cash flow model, the economic feasibility of the tax regime was evaluated
with a special interest in the pad allowance [PA], a major incentive of the fiscal
regime. We find that the design of the fiscal regime well achieves the Government's
financial objectives, but fails to support shale gas investments at lower gas prices. PA
introduces further variability in investor cash flows, ultimately defeating the ethos of
the incentive. We propose a reduction in the overall tax rate from 40% to no more than
21%; a removal of the additional tax charge (Supplementary Charge) and an
amendment of PA rules to; (1) allow an extension of RFES to PA; (2) permit transfer of
activated PA across companies in the same group; and (3) redefine capital expenditure
to include intermediate well retirement costs necessary to drill new wells to stimulate
production. Such a tax strategy would simplify and align the UK fiscal regime with
practices across the US, China, Algeria and Canada. Importantly, it would better match
the risk of shale gas investments to its rewards and could better attract investments. We 
recommend the strategy for emerging unconventional oil and gas producing countries
for an efficient design of their fiscal regimes.
Keywords: Fiscal regime, shale gas, pad allowance, risk, investment, taxation
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1.0 Introduction
The UK is believed to hold shale gas deposits in the Bowland Hodder of
Northern England; the Midland Valley Basin in Scotland and a small area of Wales
(BGS-DECC1 2014). Indeed, the Oil and Gas Authority’s (OGA) reserves models 
indicate a central estimate of 1,419.6 trillion cubic feet (tcf) of total in-place shale gas
resources from all basins (Department for Energy and Climate Change [DECC] 2013;
BGS-DECC 2014). Relatedly, the US Energy Information Administration [EIA] (2013;
2015) predicts that about 26 tcf of UK’s shale gas reserves are technically recoverable.
Importantly, the UK Onshore Oil and Gas Group (UKOOG) recently revised its central 
production scenarios for shale gas up by 72% to 5.5 billion cubic feet (bcf) per lateral 
well (UKOOG 2019). This was in recognition of Cuadrilla Resources Ltd, the operating 
company’s higher than anticipated initial flow test results which had shown production
of between 3 and 8 million cubic feet (mmcf) a day of shale gas per lateral well from its
PNR-1z site (Cuadrilla 2019). Whilst these are promising geological results, the
development presents a challenge to the government and industry to consider the most
suitable regulatory and fiscal environment that will support the effective and efficient
development of the resource. 
Extant research on the economics of UK shale gas generally show a very high
breakeven natural gas price of over $7 per mmcf (Acquah-Andoh 2015; Ahmed and
Rezaei-Gomari 2018). Cooper, Stamford and Azapagic (2018) report that UK shale gas
is twice more expensive than liquefied natural gas (LNG) imports and thrice more
expensive than the US shale gas. By extension, UK’s shale gas may not be profitable
within the current regulatory, market, fiscal or geological environments. Nonetheless, 
the recent drilling results by Cuadrilla and an initial test by Ineos Gas Ltd. from its 
1 BGS - British Geological Survey, DECC – Department for Energy and Climate Change
3
   
 
 
          
      
          
    
              
       
           
        
       
     
           
          
     
            
              
              
         
         
          
       
       
            
             
         
            
Tinker Lane site in Nottinghamshire, England, suggest some empirical evidence to
believe that geological conditions, although subject to further testing and confirmation,
may not be the primary cause for concern about profitability (Cuadrilla 2019; DECC
2013; UKOOG 2019a).
Oil and gas companies are price takers due to the oligopolistic nature of the
markets (Berger 1988; Lin 2014). Individual companies thus refrain from investing or
cut back on capital expenditure (CE) during low product price regimes (Lin 2014; Liu
2017; Kim and Choi, 2019; Financial Times June 15 2016; Reuters October 3 2018).
Generally, fiscal regimes could increase overall operating costs, drive breakeven prices
higher and deter investments (Goldsworthy and Zakharova 2010). Nevertheless, 
regulatory and fiscal factors could be influenced by governments to render otherwise
economically unattractive oil and gas development projects attractive by reviewing
them. The 13th Onshore Petroleum Licensing Round which awarded first production,
exploration and development licences (PEDL) for shale gas in the UK, is now over 10
years. Yet, the industry can only boast of some £400 million to £500 million of
investments in the resource, with only one well fractured so far without any certain
prospects for commercial production in the near future (Cuadrilla 2019; UKOOG 2019;
UKOOG 2019a). Because unconventional oil and gas are riskier to exploit than
conventional resources (Aguilera 2014; Le 2018; Hanania et al. 2019), the UK
government introduced fiscal incentives to differentiate the tax treatment of shale gas
investments from conventional gas investments (HM Treasury 2013a).
In a consultation launched in 2013, the UK government invited evidences on the
economics of shale gas development upon which it based the country’s shale gas fiscal
regime (HM Treasury 2013a). Generally, respondents agreed with the government over
some aspects of its proposed fiscal regime. For example, it was agreed that Pad
4
   
 
 
        
     
        
       
              
             
       
   
       
         
          
       
          
          
             
        
         
        
          
            
      
        
    
     
            
Allowance (PA) and Ring Fence Expenditure Supplement (RFES), important incentive
features of the proposed fiscal regime, satisfied the government’s envisioned objectives
for shale gas (HM Treasury 2013a). However, some respondents also raised
fundamental issues over the operation of the PA. For example, losses from unsuccessful 
pads could not be paid from revenues from successful ones; RFES did not cover PA; 
activated PA could not be transferred across companies in the same group, among
others (HM Treasury 2013a). Subsequently, following the consultation, the government 
introduced cross pad relief (CPR) to allow the settlement of losses from unsuccessful
pads with revenues from successful ones, but all other issues were, and remain,
unchanged as the government did not believe in additional changes. The said fiscal
regime has thus been left unrevised due to what in the authors’ opinion stems from an
acute lack of scientific research that comprehensively evaluates the economic effects of 
the critical tax and incentive features that purport to render the fiscal regime generous
as claimed by the government. Energy security, job creation, tax revenues for the
exchequer among others are the envisioned benefits from shale gas and the government
has offered specific fiscal incentives that in its opinion should support the industry to
exploit the resource economically (HM Treasury 2013a; OGA 2017; Acquah-Andoh et 
al. 2018). Yet, since its introduction in 2013, a review of the fiscal regime has been
lacking and ultimately led to a lack of feedback on its continued viability in response to 
current developments such as the level of investments, industry production tests results
and geological potential, natural gas markets and pricing, delayed industry projects due
to environmental protests, operational difficulty and the general health of shale gas
production business with specific lessons from the US.
With motivation from the foregoing paradox, this paper seeks to test the
viability of the fiscal regime through an investigation of the efficiency of investments in
5
   
 
 
          
         
          
     
             
         
              
           
             
         
      
     
           
       
     
           
             
           
     
          
 
        
          
            
        
shale gas exploration and development in the UK. Based on the unique characteristics
of the Midland Valley Shale (MVS), we investigate and address the question of the
extent to which PA and RFES prove government support for the industry at the early 
stage of investment in the resource.
The study makes a number of important contributions to our understanding of
the impacts of fiscal regimes on unconventional oil and gas investments. For example,
as a novel research, it contributes to the development of literature on the economics and
fiscal analysis of UK shale gas through a comprehensive analysis of the implications of
the proposed shale gas fiscal regime for investor capital and returns. Also, it provides
initial feedback on the shale gas fiscal regime and recommends important policy
options for its amendment. Finally, the study recommends a fiscal strategy that satisfies 
capital efficiency tests for investments in an emerging unconventional oil and gas
producing country and such strategy should provide a model approach of development
to similar emerging countries with potentially commercial volumes of unconventional
oil and gas reserves in Europe and elsewhere.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Capital efficiency measures and
the UK fiscal regime for shale gas, and the MVS are presented in section 2. In section 3, 
the methods of data analysis, cost and fiscal basis along with production decline
considerations and production curves are presented. Section 4 presents and discusses
the results, while section 5 concludes the paper with key policy recommendations.
2.1 Capital Investment Efficiency Factors for Shale Gas Development
Total US shale gas production reached 17 tcf in 2016 (EIA 2018), but at the
same time substantial amounts have been invested by the industry with a 53% rise in
shale oil and gas projects in 2017 over 2016 (Forbes 2017). Developing oil and gas is
6
   
 
 
              
           
            
     
          
          
            
        
            
      
        
              
     
           
            
         
           
     
          
           
            
      
            
          
          
expensive and risky but shale gas development, in particular, has a higher cost structure
although with a larger reserves base than conventional oil or gas (Forbes 2017). 
Significantly, companies that engage in this venture require a minimum return on risk
capital to approve investments. Thus, oil and gas prospects must satisfy a capital 
efficiency test by showing at least a minimum rate of return. 
Recently, the IEA in its World Energy Investments 2017 noted a transformation
in the way oil and gas companies currently operate by focusing on simplified and
streamlined projects that have shorter investment payback period (PBP) (IEA 2018). 
This seems to arise from the high-risk/ high cost, but a low commodity price
environment for oil and gas operators . Forbes (2018) reports that the marginal cost of
shale gas was $4/ million British thermal units (mmbtu) for US companies against a
unit price of $3.77/mmbtu (see Figures 1 and 2). Investment in shale gas, under the
current market and cost structures thus may even be met by industry with stricter
economic evaluation criteria. Some major players in the US Marcellus shale have
struggled to keep their heads above water at the current market price for gas. For
example, while “Cabot, Range and Antero spent an average of $1.43 for every $1.00
they earned in 2016, Chesapeake had negative earnings for 2016 and could not even pay 
for operating expenses out of its revenues” (Forbes 2018). 
For prospective investment and in particular, for mutually exclusive projects, 
project economists have developed metrics around cost-benefit ratios to measure the
relative benefits that projects return vis-à-vis the cost to accept the investment. For
example, metrics such as return on investment (ROI), profitability index (PI), net
present value (NPV), internal rate of return (IRR), growth rate of return (Komlosi 1999; 
Capen, Clapp and Phelps 1976; Burkolder, Coopersmith and Schulze 2014;
Abughazaleh 2018) are among the simple but most popular measures that have been
7
   
 
 
         
           
            
         
      
            
    
            
          
           
           
             
        
        
 
        
           
            
     
 
                                                 
        
used in the oil and gas industry to determine capital investment efficiency.
In this research, efficient investment is defined as the ability of shale gas
development projects to return investor risk capital plus a premium, within reasonable
certainty and timeframe. In other words, a shale gas development project that adds
economic value to shareholders’ wealth through a fair return on investor capital, which
is commensurate with the level of risk borne by the oil and gas company within the
operational, market and fiscal environments is considered as an efficient investment. 
For any oil and gas development investment, the effects of the fiscal regime can be
captured as the difference between pre-tax and post-tax cash flows. To gauge the capital
investment efficiency, investors may use the IRR as a proxy for the “reservation
utility”, thus, the return which should trigger investing in the mineral resources
(Mommer 1999). For a risky mineral resource project to go ahead, the investor requires
a higher risk premium, something that increases the supply price of investment and
consequently reduces the economic rent2 the state can tax (Baunsgaard 2001).
Figure 1: 40-Year Cost Structure of Shale Gas Showing (Forbes 2018)
 
The current cost structure of shale gas production has been found to be consistent with a 40-year average 

natural gas price at of $3.40 per mmbtu. This price is lower than a typical marginal cost of shale gas
 
production of $4 per mmbtu.
 
2 The portion of project returns the state can tax without discouraging investment 
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Figure 2: Marginal Cost of US Shale Gas Plays at $4/MMBTU since 2014 (Forbes 2018)
 




2.2 Oil and Gas Fiscal Regimes and Investments 
Petroleum fiscal regimes (PFR) have been conventionally crafted based on
rent theory, to capture economic or resource ‘rent’, defined as the excess profit or 
excess of hydrocarbon development and production revenues over costs (Tordo,
Johnston and Johnston 2010; Johnston 2003; Mommer 1999). The fiscal regime
guides and governs transactions that occur between the state that owns the subsurface
mineral rights as a principal, and the oil and gas company as an investor and agent
that normally takes the risk of exploration with the view to successful
commercialisation of oil and or gas to recover their investments and make a profit.
Mommer (1999) describes two types of PFR as Liberal Petroleum Fiscal
Regimes (LPFR) and Proprietorial Petroleum Fiscal Regimes (PPFR), and explains
that marginal fiscal take is zero in the former but not the latter. Specifically, in
LPFRs the state attempts to avoid obstructing the free flow of investments and
therefore taxes only excess profits over capital and operating costs. The objective of 
9
   
 
 
        
       
           
       
        
       
    
    
        
   
       
       
         
           
      
         
          
      
       
     
           
        
           
           
            
LPFR is to achieve low prices; hence fiscal terms attached to a licence may be
crafted to encourage competition and cooperation among operators. Significantly,
taxes are mostly income based rather than revenue based, which ultimately take into
account the geological and market factors before taxing the operator’s revenues from 
resource extraction. PPFR, on the other hand, has a positive marginal rent as a 
hallmark. This is a reservation ground-rent, which puts a threshold on investment
(Mommer 1999). Such fiscal regimes are somewhat efficient too, but the ultimate 
objective is to collect higher rent, similar to a landlord-tenant relationship. Whereas 
government policy aims to tax away excess profits from the investor in PPFRs,
LPFRs aim to lower prices for consumers via efficient management of natural 
resources and unhindered development of the resource. According to Mommer
(1999), investors require a minimum reservation profit on their investment, but note 
that above the reservation profit, the host government also requires a reservation
ground-rent to be paid by an oil company. Arguably, oil or gas will be invested in 
and exploited only as long as it is profitable for companies to do so. 
The UK’s PFR for conventional hydrocarbons has been cited as an excellent
example of LPFR in response to the oil industry nationalisations in the 1970s 
(Mommer 1999). However, to what extent might the UK’s excellent management of
conventional hydrocarbons extend to unconventional hydrocarbons in a radically
different shale industry? Baunsgaard (2001) argues that pure rent represents excess
profits unrequired to influence economic behaviour, something that the states can tax 
away without distorting investor decision to invest in the resource. Baunsgaard
(2001), however, cautions that rent is affected by the opportunity cost of investment
or the supply price of investment; equated to the investor’s minimum required return,
which is made up of their CAPEX and operating expenditures (OPEX) plus a risk
10
   
 
 
            
       
     
          
 
         
         
         
       
     
        
     
       
        
  
            
         
         
         
       
         
        
      
            
        
premium. Cost and cost of capital, the author argues, are affected by commercial and
political risks. Consequently, the nature of a country’s fiscal design can affect the
risk premium that investors expect from oil and gas investments in that country,
based on the perceived and the actual inherent political, economic and geological
risks.
As argued by Acquah-Andoh et al. (2019b), Brexit and geological uncertainty 
appear to have increased the risk premium for energy investments in the UK. For a
given return on investment, the lower the supply price of investment or cost of
capital, the higher the economic rent. For this reason, it is argued that during
petroleum contract negotiation, host governments may forfeit some revenues to offer
incentives to companies in the interest of attracting risk capital to develop and
produce their oil and gas resources (Baunsgaard 2001). For emerging unconventional
natural gas producer states, this may be a crucial imperative to developing their
resource due to the characteristically high risks and uncertainty to investor capital
and returns.
Given the specific risky atmosphere for fracking investments in the UK, it
might be pragmatic for the government to sacrifice more than normal economic gains
at this early stage by redesigning the fiscal regime to a more pro-liberal one in order 
to incentivise investment as necessary. This will exert a downward force on the
supply price of investment to potential investors in shale gas and ultimately, holding
the effects of company specific financial risks constant, lead to reduced discount
rates (i.e. risk premiums) in investment appraisal models. The pro-liberal PFR is
more likely to attract investment because shale gas projects are more expensive and
have a longer PBP than conventional offshore field (HM Treasury 2013; Le 2018
p.8; Hanania et al. 2019; Aguilera 2014). The UK government confirms its
11
   
 
 
    
          
          




             
        
       
        
         
        
         
     
  
 
    
 
    
          
 
           
   
  
       
      
  
        
 
         
           
awareness and notes that “shale gas developments require multiple investments, 
often across a much wider area than a traditional oil field – increasing ongoing cost 
and uncertainty” (HM Treasury 2013a). Hence, a potential redesign of the current
fiscal regime could be consistent with the government’s beliefs and commitment to 
support the nascent industry.
2.3 The UK Fiscal Regime for Shale Gas
As Table 1 illustrates, the UK Hydrocarbon tax regime shows three major
elements: Ring Fence Corporation Tax (RFCT); Supplementary Charge (SC); and
Petroleum Revenue Tax (PRT) (Ernst and Young [EY] 2018). RFCT works in 
similar ways to corporate tax, but restricts the way taxable profits are applied to 
recover finance costs and losses from oil and gas operations in the UK. SC on the
other hand, does not allow for the deduction of finance costs, but applies additional
charges on the operator’s ring fenced profits. PRT only applies to fields that were
granted development consent before 16th March, 1993 (HM Treasury 2013; Acquah-
Andoh, 2015). For this research, PRT is not applicable.
Table 1: Summary of Petroleum Taxes
Tax Regime % Description
RFCT 30 This is taxed on profits from oil and gas exploration and
production.
SC 10 This was 32% in 2011, but reduced to 20% as of 1 January 
2015 and then to 10%, from 1 January 2016 
PRT 50
Petroleum Revenue Tax Rate is only applicable for fields
which received development consent before 16th of March
1993.
Sources: EY (2018); HM Treasury (2013); Acquah-Andoh, (2015)
Specifically, the UK government has stated that “it would be irresponsible of
government not to do everything it can to support the safe and sustainable 
12
   
 
 
     
        
         
       
       
 
 
        
   
         
        
      
          
       
     
   
  
       
           
        
      
    
  
        
      
         
          
      
           
         
       
  
        
 
          
          
      
        
           
      
        
        
development of shale gas” (HM Treasury 2013a). To this end, the government has
created additional incentives regime that should in its own words help to “unlock the
investment needed by putting the right fiscal and regulatory framework in place”
(HM Treasury 2013). To encourage early investment in shale gas exploration, the
government in its Budget 2013, announced additional tax incentives as outlined in
Table 2.
Table 2: Tax Incentives for Shale Gas Development in the UK
Incentive Description
1 PA Similar to Field Allowance for conventional fields, PA exempts a 
portion of shale gas revenues from SC, reducing an operator’s
effective tax liability on the exempted portion of revenues to
potentially 32% or the prevailing rate for RFCT. PA exempts only a
share of pad related expenditure – typically those expenditures that
qualify for 100% first year capital allowance.
2 Extended RFES from 6 Enables companies to compound uplift their losses of pre-production
to 10 years costs by 10% per annum for up to 10 years, until losses/ costs are fully 
repaid from future production revenues. This is analogous to the
existing regime for conventional hydrocarbon development
3 First Year 100%
Capital Allowance
The first year investments by an operator are all allowed to be treated 
as losses carried forward and recovered from future production
revenues before income tax is due. Tax measures recognise there are
huge upfront costs to shale gas development and aim to support the
industry during this difficult phase, through the recovery of all first
year CAPEX plus RFES at 10% capital uplift for 10 years and PA to
reduce the initial higher costs per pad. PA could be transferred to 
unsuccessful pad but could only be activated on the revenues from
same pad
Source: HM Treasury 2013; 2013a; EY 2018 and 2019
The government is of the view that, collectively, the tax proposal in Tables 1 and
2 make a “generous” fiscal regime for shale gas in the UK (HM Treasury 2013). In
particular, the regime combines the fiscal features of the traditional Ring Fence Tax 
Regime and the additional incentives to potentially spice investment (HM Treasury
2013). Figure 3 summarises the fiscal regime and illustrates a schematic flow of the
split of shale gas revenues between investors and the state. From left to right,
operator gross revenues are taxed twice at a RFCT gate (E2), and SC gate (E4)
before reaching operator net revenues after tax. RFCT is charged after allowing for
13
   
 
 
         
        
 
 
        
 
 
           
             
       
              
                
               
       
        
              
          
 
 
ring fence costs (E3), whilst SC is made after allowing for finance costs and a
moderating effect of PA and RFES for all first-year CAPEX as well as exploration
costs.
Figure 3: Illustration of the UK’s Shale Gas Tax Framework
2.4 The Midland Valley Shale of UK
The midland valley (MV) is made up of four carboniferous stratigraphic units
that contain shale oil and gas at different depths stacked vertically. Its mature organic-
rich mudstones are stacked in a sandstone-limestone-shale interval of up to 9,800 feet 
(ft) (3,000 metres (m)) thick. The thickness of the various shale units varies from a few
inches up to 160ft and the percentage of shale in the succession varies from 0 to 85%.
Due to burial, uplift and erosion, shales in the MV are matured for oil generation from
depths of about 2,300ft. The total gas in place is about 49.4 -134.6 tcf (BGS-DECC
2014). Whereas Table 3 summarises the geophysical and petrophysical properties of the
MV shale used to develop this research, Figure 4 represents the map of the
carboniferous units and areas with potentials for shale resource exploration.
14
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U.S Shale Gas Data 
(Andrews 2013)





U.S Shale Gas Data 
(Andrews 2013)




U.S Shale Gas Data 
(British Geological 
Survey [BGS] 2013)
Figure 4: Prospective Area for Shale Gas and oil of the Midland Valley Shale.
Red Area (gas), blue area (oil) and purple area (study area). (Source: BGS-DECC 2014)
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3. Methodology
This section presents the assumptions and models that underpin the research.
Specifically, we detail the geological basis for production decline for three development 
concepts in subsection 3.1, and present the resulting production curves (subsections 3.2 –
3.3). We also present economic and fiscal assumptions as well as the models that were
used to generate the results of the study (subsections 3.4-3.6). Of the three development
concepts, cases one and two arguably produce the production curves that best align with
current research and industry data about the UK’s shale gas production (UKOOG 2019,
Cuadrilla 2019, Acquah-Andoh 2015; Institute of Directors [IoD] 2013). Nonetheless,
for the sake of the analysis, case three was also considered for its economic and fiscal 
implications.
3.1 Development Concepts and Data
A multi-pad drilling was assumed for the development of the MV shale due to
its cost efficiency and popularity within the fracking industry. Preliminary
development considerations are summarised as development concepts in Table 4.
Table 4: Field Development Concepts and Production Curve Scenarios
Parameter Concept/ Case 1 Concept/ Case 2 Concept/ Case 3
Drilling 10 well pads with 10 
laterals
10 well pads with 40 
laterals
10 x 10 well-pads with 
40 laterals per pad
Drilling Schedule 1 well pad per year 1 well pad per year 10 well pads per year
Exploratory Wells 4 4 4
Well Flow Rate 2mmscf per day 3mmcf per day 4mmcf per day
Gas Recovery/ Well 4.9 billion cubic feet 7.4 billion cubic feet 9.87 billion cubic feet
Estimated Ultimate Recovery 1.8 trillion cubic feet 2.8 trillion cubic feet 3.8 trillion cubic feet
As Table 4 demonstrates, the technical considerations for well pad density adopted 
are aimed at achieving an average of 10-15% recovery rate. The average well spacing
ranged 40-150acres/well. The average surface well pad requirement was 5 acres
16
   
 
 
           
        
          
      
 
  
         
      
        
         
     
    
 
   
       
          
       
       
      
         
      
             
          
           
       
(2ha) IoD 2013). The drilling and fracturing of development wells follow a phased
yearly approach, with 1-40 average number of pad drilled per year. Similar economic
simulations have been considered in the work of Acquah-Andoh (2015). Overall,
Table 4 results in various production curves as shown in Figures 5 and 6.
3.2 Production Curves
Production profiles were modelled based on three initial flow rate (Qi) 
scenarios and varying total number of wells drilled throughout the proposed field
life. Guoa et al. (2017) and Wachtmeister et al. (2017) in a study of US shale gas
wells production data found that a hyperbolic decline based on the Arps’s decline
equation best explained the decline behaviours of US shale gas wells. Hyperbolic
decline based on Arps’s equation was thus used to construct the production model for
the UK shale gas, in line with the reasoning in authoritative research on UK shale gas 
resource potential (BGS-DECC 2014; IoD 2013; Regeneris and Cuadrilla 2011). B-
factor of 0.6377 and average monthly (Di) factor of 0.0325, assumed from the
Fayetteville Field of the US to generate a 45-year well production profile. For this
model the abandonment production rate (economic limit) was assumed to be
0.09mmscfd. It is important to note that the average well production decline
generated with a hyperbolic formula decreases a well's production life. The
consequent decline trend was analogous to those from Regeneris and Caudrila’s
work on the Bowland shale of the UK in 2011 (Regeneris and Cuadrilla 2011).
Figures 5 and 6 show the resulting production curves for the single well and
multi-well full field development concepts for cases one, two and three. The yearly
drilling requirements imply a need for substantial yearly CAPEX and will also imply 
a percentage increase in OPEX. This is typical of shale gas development projects 
17
   
 
 
        
  
 
   
            
       
      
              
         
          
   
 
 
          
 
                  
              
                  






because costs tend to be much higher in the early years of exploration and
development.
3.3 Initial Production
The production profiles displayed in Figures 5 and 6 present three scenarios 
of estimated ultimate recovery (EUR) of reserves based on assumed initial
production of 2 million cubic feet per day (mmcfd) to 4mmcfd. The EUR is affected 
by the value of the decline and hyperbolic constant used in modelling. Average well
production per year for the 45-year period ranged from 4.9 to 9.8 bcf. This rate is 
similar to that reported in earlier work by Regenris and Cuadrilla (2011), IoD (2013),



















































Single Well Production Profiles
2mmscfd 3 mmscfd 
4 mmscfd Cum 2mmscfd 
Cum 3mmscfd Cum 3mmscfd 
Figure 5: Production Curves/ Profiles for a Single Lateral Well
Figure 5 shows the full range of production curves based on initial well flow rates of 2 mmcfd, 3 mmcfd and 4
mmcfd. The graph also illustrates the estimated ultimate recovery EUR for all 3 production concepts at 4.9 bcf, 
7.4 bcf and 9.8 bcf for a single lateral well. These production profiles translate to the total pad production profiles
presented in Figure 6 below for all lateral well production scenarios.
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Pad Production Profile 
Annual @ 2mmscfd Annual @ 3mmscfd Annual @ 4mmscfd 
Cum @ 2mmscfd) Cum @ 3mmscfd) Cum @ 4mmscfd) 
Figure 6: Pad Production Profiles Showing Annual Cumulative Pad Rates
3.4 Field Abandonment
In this research, we assumed that wells will be abandoned at an economic rate
of 0.09 mmcfd or after 45years of production, whichever occurs first. This is because
production rates for a well are expected to be so low leading to a negative cash flow
on a well by well basis, a situation typical of shale gas wells (Hughes 2014). We also
assumed that 10 well pads with 40 laterals will use 2 hectares of land (Acquah-
Andoh 2015; Kaiser 2012).
3.5 Capital  and Operating Expenditures
CAPEX comprise drilling, completion, fracturing cost, license, land
acquisition and facility costs (Kaiser 2012). Costs from the US Haynesville shale 
wells were used as a guide in CAPEX assumptions for this study. Abandonment
costs are included in the cost of wells. Community benefits are not a legal 
requirement of the shale gas fiscal regime of the UK; industry players who are
members of the UKOOG have signed up to this proposal by UKOOG as a way of
earning community trust to operate. As it has been argued, industry players are not
19
 
   
 
 
           
        
        
   
             
        
     
         
      
 
        
    
  
    




            
       
    
             
      
    
            
    
     
  
 




    
      
  
 
obliged to pay these fees hence this has not been captured in our models as the study
attempts to capture and measure the implications of the UK fiscal regime as it exists 
by law. Exploration expenditure was immediately depreciated and all other CAPEX 
was depreciated at 10% on a RBB.
Because shale gas is still at an early stage in UK and the difficulty in
obtaining OPEX data, fixed OPEX and Variable OPEX were assumed based on
inputs from the IoD (2013) estimates. Therefore, OPEX is escalated at 3%. Gas price
of 32.12 pence per therm was used in our models and converted to its $/mmbtu
equivalent of $4.69/mmbtu. Tabel 5 summarises our cost references for this research.
Table 5: Comparative CAPEX and OPEX References









Bowland shale, UK £8 to £12 million (EY and UKOOG 2014); £10.5 million
(Regeneris Consulting & Cuadrilla Resources Ltd. 2011); $15 ­
$20 million (Acquah-Andoh 2015)
Facility Costs Bowland shale, UK 15% of drilling and fracturing costs (Regeneris Consulting &
Cuadrilla Resources Ltd. 2011); £5 million (Amion Consulting
and Peel Gas and Oil Ltd. 2015)
Operating costs Bowland shale, UK Fixed opex = £0.5 million per year; variable opex 2.5% of
cumulative capex (IoD 2013); $1.50/ Mcf variable; $25,000
fixed plus 15% overheads (Acquah-Andoh 2015);
Operating costs Haynesville shale, 
US
2008 = $0.85; 2009 = $0.80; 2010 = $0.50 (Kaiser 2012)
3.6 Economic Modelling
3.6.1. Cash Flow Modelling
Net Cash Flow (NCF) is the summation of all cash received, less all associated
expenses, taxes and investment on an annual basis over the life of a project. Equation (1)
specifies the cash flow model for our analysis.
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∗ 𝑡𝐶𝐴𝑃𝐸𝑋 −𝑡𝑡𝑠𝑜𝑠𝑒𝑟𝐶ℎ𝑂𝑡−)𝑡𝑃𝐴+𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒ℎ𝐶𝑝𝑆𝑢(−𝑡𝑡𝑜𝑠𝐶𝑛𝐹𝑖 −𝑡𝑅𝐹𝐶𝑇 −𝑡𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑅𝐹−𝑡𝐺𝑅[= 𝑡𝑁𝐶𝐹
(1 − 𝐵) − 𝑂𝑃𝐸𝑋𝑡] …… (1) 
Where NCFt is the net cash flow in year t, GRt is the gross revenues in year t, RF Expt is
the ring fence expenditure in year t, 𝑅𝐹𝐶𝑇𝑡 is the RFCT charge in year t, is𝑡𝑡𝐹𝑖𝑛𝐶𝑜𝑠
is a in t, is PA year 𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒ℎ𝑝𝐶𝑆𝑢,finance cost in year t SC year 𝑃𝐴𝑡 the in t,
is all other costs incurred by an operator, but which do not qualify as ring𝑡𝑠𝑡𝑠𝑜𝑒𝑟𝐶ℎ𝑂𝑡 
fence expenses under the fiscal regime in year t, 𝐶𝐴𝑃𝐸𝑋𝑡 is the capital expenditures in
year t, B is proxy for the investment credit/ capital allowance, such as the RFES and
OPEXt is for all qualifying operating expenditures in year t. From left to right, equation
(1) also illustrates the point at which various variables entered the determination of NCF
in our modelling. RFCT was charged at 30%, before SC at 10%.
It is important to highlight that the cash flow model adopted in this study has been
applied by other researchers (e.g. Iledare 2004; 2010; Kaiser 2012; Sen 2014). Whereas
Iledare (2004; 2010) applied a similar modelling concept to model a progressive
development strategy for oil and gas in Nigeria, Kaiser (2012) applied a similar concept
to analyse the profitability of Haynesville shale of the US. Recently, Sen (2014) applied
the same modelling concept to analyse India’s fiscal regime for petroleum exploration.
3.6.2. Gross Revenues
The gross revenues in year t are proceeds from the sale of shale gas. This was
modelled using equation (2) below.
𝑖𝐺𝑅𝑖 = ∑ 𝑔𝑡
𝑖 𝑃𝑡
𝑖𝑄𝑡 …… (2) 
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i i iGenerally, gt, Pt , and Qt each represents the conversion factor of commodity i in year t, 
projected price of commodity i and total production of commodity i, respectively. In this 
research, the saleable unit of gas is mmbtu. Gas is not converted, hence equation (2) was
adapted as:
𝑖𝐺𝑅𝑖 = ∑ 1 𝑥 𝑃𝑡
𝑖𝑄𝑡 .…. (3)
3.6.3 Investment Decision Criteria
In this study, and in line with existing oil and gas economics literature and
practice, three investment appraisal methods were used to appraise the viability of the 
project which include PBP, NPV and IRR. PBP is the time it takes for project
investments to be fully recovered. Subsequent revenues received after the PBP are
considered profits generated by the project. As reported earlier, oil and gas companies
now prefer projects with shorter PBP (Forbes 2018). Equation 4 represents our PBP
model as follows:
1 
)4…. (+𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑠 𝑁𝐶𝐹𝑣𝑒−𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑚𝑢𝑙𝑎𝐶𝑢 =𝑃𝐵𝑃 
(+𝑣𝑒 𝑁𝐶𝐹−(−𝑣𝑒 𝑁𝐶𝐹))∗(−𝑣𝑒 𝑁𝐶𝐹) 
where Cumulative -ve NCF years represents the cumulative negative net cash flows
years; +ve NCF represents positive net cash flows and -ve NCF represents negative net
cash flows.
NPV is the summation of all future project cash flows discounted back into the
present value to recognise the time value of money (Clews 2016). It represents the worth
of future cash that would be invested today at a specified interest rate to yield that cash at
that time in the future. Considering our analysis is based on a 45 year well life, it was
22
   
 
 
    
     
 
               
 
        
 
    
     
  
 
            
 
    
  
  
   
      
       
   
        
   
    




necessary to convert future costs and revenues into present worth for valid and reliable
economic reasoning. Equation 5 represents our NPV model as follows:
𝑁𝐶𝐹𝑡𝑘𝑁𝑃𝑉 = ∑ ….... (5)𝑡=1 (1+𝑟)𝑡 
where NCFt is the net cash flow, t is the reference period (years) and r is the discount
rate.
The IRR is the discount rate at which the NPV of the project cash flow reduces to 
zero. It is an important parameter in measuring the profitability of projects. Equation 6
represents our IRR model as follows:
𝑁𝐶𝐹𝑡𝑛𝐼𝑅𝑅 = ∑ = 0 …. (6)𝑖=1 (1+𝑟)𝑡 
Where IRR represents the internal rate of return, 𝑁𝐶𝐹𝑡 represents the net cash flows in 
time t, r represents the discount rate and t represents the time in years.
Significantly, the development and profitability of shale gas plays depend on a
range of factors that influences the field economics, which includes the gas price, 
production volumes, CAPEX and OPEX (Kaiser 2012). Table 6 summarises the input
parameters used in this research. Consistent with previous literature, a discount rate of
10% was applied to our cash flows. For example, the Society of Petroleum Evaluation 
Engineers’ [SPEE] (2007; 2009; 2013; 2018; 2019) survey of the oil and gas industry’s
asset valuation practices has reported the application of an average of 10% discount rate 
as common practice. This is indeed confirmed by the application of 10% in most oil and 
gas economics research (see Daniel 2017; Tinker 2013; Kaiser 2012; Chen et al 2015;
Acquah-Andoh 2015, 2019).
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Table 6: Summary of Input Parameters
Parameter Assumed Rate
Well drilling, completion & abandonment costs $15 million – $25 million
Facility costs $10 million – 20 million
Variable opex, including overheads 2% of capex
Fixed opex $25,000 per annum
Gas price $4.69/ mmbtu
Land Acquisition cost $0.43 million/ acre
Well spacing 40 acres
Cost of capital 10%
Ring fence corporate charge 30%
Supplementary charge 10%
Pad Allowance activated 100%
Initial production 2 mmcfd – 4 mmcfd
Gas price escalation 3%
Opex escalation 3%
Capex escalation 3%
In this study, the effects of the parameters in Table 6 on project profitability were
examined and we now present and discuss the results in section 4.
4.0 Results and Discussion
4.1 Economics of the Midland Valley Shale
Table 7 presents the results of economic analysis of the production curves.
Table 7: Results of Economics Analysisa
Case/ Model Input Parameters Results Pre-tax
Post-
tax
Case One: NPV ($Million) -2,732 -2,732
EUR = 2mmcfd; Capex = $100M/ well; Opex = $1.2/ Mcf; IP =
2mmcfd; FRCT = 30%; SC = 10%; PA = 100%; Gas price =
$4.9/ mmbtu
IRR (%) -9.6 -9.6
Average yearly EUR per well (Bcf) 4.9 4.9
Case Two:
EUR = 3mmcfd; Capex = $110M/ well; Opex = $1.5/ Mcf; IP =
3mmcfd; RFCT = 30%; SC = 10%; PA = 100%; Gas price =
$4.9/ mmbtu
NPV ($Million) -1,189 -1,189
IRR (%) 4 4
Average yearly EUR per well (Bcf) 7.4 7.4
Case Three:
NPV ($Million) 2,517 2,098
EUR = 4mmcfd; Capex = $120M/ well; Opex = $1.5/ Mcf; IP = IRR (%) 22 18
4mmcfd; RFCT = 30%; SC = 10%; PA = 100%; Gas price $4.9/
mmbtu
PBP 13 19
Average yearly EUR per well (Bcf) 9.8 9.8
a 
Table 7 presents the economic feasibility of all production scenarios as earlier presented in Table 4.
At gas price of up to $4.69 per mmbtu, average EUR of up to 7.4 bcf per well over the life of shale gas
project is unprofitable. At 7.4 bcf EUR, a minimum gas price of $6.20 per mmbtu is required to
breakeven. An EUR of 9.8 bcf per well returns a post-tax NPV of ~ $2.1 billion but this recovery rate
is about 22.5% higher than the current maximum estimates for the US’s prolific Marcellus shale and
also 22.5% higher than the UKOOG’s current average estimate of 8 bcf per well for UK shale gas
wells and is thus highly unlikely to be warranted during the short to medium term of shale gas
investment. 
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As shown in Table 7, at a flow rate of 3 mmcfd per well (case two), equivalent to
an average yearly production of 7.4 bcf per well, the results are unfavourable with a
pre- tax NPV of negative $1,189 million, an IRR of 4% and a break-even price of
$6.2 per mmbtu at 10% cost of capital; this is $4.2/ Mcf for Canada (Chen et. al
2015). At ~ 5 bcf per well EUR (i.e. case one), the results are less favourable with
pre-tax NPV of negative $2,732 million and IRR of negative 9.6% at 10% discount
rate and require a breakeven price of $10.29 per mmbtu. 
Figures 7 and 8 illustrate the pre-tax and post-tax cash flows for case three –
the only positive economics of the three scenarios, with EUR of ~ 10 bcf per well. 
The results indicate acceptable but not very strong economics. At gas price of $4.69/
mmbtu (~47p per therm), a pre-tax NPV of positive $2,517 Million is obtained along
with an IRR of 22%. Post tax NPV and IRR drop to $2,098 million and 18%
respectively. Relatedly, PBP increases from 13 years to 19 years for pre-tax and post-
tax economics, respectively. This sharply contrasts the average PBP of 6 years for
conventional oil and gas projects in UK (Oil and Gas UK 2019).
To put the results into perspective, the US shale wells which have been cited
widely as a benchmark for the UK shale potential have been noted to have produced
an average of about 1 bcf per year only, during the initial years of shale gas 
production (UKOOG 2019; EIA 2011). It is thus uncertain that UK shale gas wells
would be as much as four times more productive at 4 bcf initially. Although UKOOG
estimates a central case production of 5.5 bcf per well on average for UK shale gas, it
is argued in this research that such is highly unlikely to be warranted given the
limited extent of fracking on Cuadrilla’s initial flow test on its PNR-1z well and the
fact that the UK is an emerging producer with enormous uncertainty around recovery
rates, price and costs. We believe that the EUR used in the foregoing analysis
25
   
 
 
       
  
         
         
       
         
         
        
           
     
          
    
 
 





   
underscores a cautious approach to modelling the economics of UK shale gas at this
early stage of industry in this research. 
It must be said that given the nature of the riskiness of unconventional gas
exploitation and in particular the UK as an emerging producer, 10% cost of capital is
unlikely to be acceptable for fracking operations. Yet, ironically, at a typical gas 
price of $4.69 per mmbtu and an EUR of 7.4bcf, ~35% more than the UKOOG’s
new estimate of 5.5 bcf and 45% more than the current average well production of
5.1 bcf in the Marcellus Basin of the US (UKOOG 2019), fracking operations fail to
add economic value based on the analysis contained in this research. Ultimately, the
unstable economic results warrant a government intervention to inject further 
confidence in the industry in order to spur the much needed early, but risky
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Figure 7: Pre-Tax Cash Flow at $4.69/mmbtu Gas Price for Case Three
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Post-Fiscal Cash Flow Analysis 
Post Fiscal Cash Flow Cumulative production 
Designing pro-liberal fiscal regimes for the development of natural resources 
by emerging oil and gas producers is no new practice (Baunsgaard 2001). Such
liberal regimes appear to evidence government commitment to: (1) attracting risk
capital; and (2) understanding the potential of the resource. Subsequently, the fiscal 
regime may be redesigned to extract more economic rent following the elapse of the
time for learning about the potential for the resource in their territory. Emerging
unconventional producing states must be willing to embrace these truths in order to
make their attempts at developing their resources successful. We argue that 19 years 
is too long a time for the recovery of investor capital in shale gas development. It
would thus be a beneficial decision for the UK government to introduce further
confidence in investors in shale by way of additional incentives that better guarantee
the recovery of investor capital over a more reasonable period and at more acceptable
and stable returns.
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4.2 Effects of the PA on Investor Returns
PA is a shale gas tax incentive which was announced by the Conservative
Government in Budget 2013 with the following objectives: (1) encourage early
investment in shale gas exploration and development in UK; (2) maximise economic
production from UK shale reserves; and (3) ensure a fair return to UK tax payer 
(HM Treasury 2013). Further, the Government intends to use the PA as a vehicle for
ensuring flexibility of, and avoiding complexity within the shale gas fiscal regime. 
By these objectives, it hopes to adapt the fiscal regime as the industry develops and
moves from exploration through development and production.
It is important to highlight that PA operates to exempt a portion of operator 
profits from additional taxes called SC, and reduce the effective tax on the said
portion of profits from 62% to 32% (currently 40% to 30%). The amount of profit
exempt from SC is set to a proportion of the capital expenditure incurred on the pad.
In addition, there is a cross pad relief; a PA operational feature which permits losses
from unsuccessful pads to be covered from allowances generated from successful
pads, subject to two conditions. Firstly, PA can only be activated from revenues from 
successful shale gas sites. Secondly, for cross pad relief purposes, allowance can
only be activated 3 years after the expenses were incurred. The government’s reason
for the latter condition is to discourage premature abandonment of projects. The
spirit of the regime’s incentives is consistent with good petroleum fiscal regime
design practice because the tax regime targets profits rather than revenues (Johnston
2003; Nakhle 2016; Nauffal, Kassab, and Nakhle 2016; Nakhle 2010). From Figure 
9, analogous to R-Factor contracts, the PA appears to introduce a dampening effect
into the fiscal regime; wiping out the upside potential of shale gas investor returns on
one hand - the windfall profits that may result from favourable geological, cost and
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price conditions, but protecting the investor’s risk capital to an extent, on the
downside too as suggested by Johnston (2003).
It can be seen from Figure 9 though, that as gas price increases from $3.10/
mmbtu towards $10/ mmbtu, the vertical distance between the pre-fiscal IRR on one
hand and PA and post- fiscal IRR line widens. This gap indicates the effects of PA at 
higher gas prices on investor returns; taxing away economic rent in a manner similar 
to PPFRs as suggested by Mommer (1999). Interestingly, this gap disappears as
natural gas price falls to the lower end of the 3 curves and in fact all curves converge
at $3.10/ mmbtu. This situation implies that the PA machinery provides less and less
protection/ support for investors at lower natural gas prices where they need it most,
but quickly gathers the windfall that may result from increased prices for the
government. This “hidden tax” machinery well satisfies government objective of 
ensuring returns for taxpayers, but the situation conflicts with popular fiscal design
ideals of fair government-investor risk-reward sharing in petroleum fiscal design
literature (Nakhle 2008). 
Currently, PA rules do not permit the extension of RFES to allowances; RFES
allows an operator to uplift their losses by 10% for up to 10 years, to reasonably 
protect the time value of the loss, until it can be recovered. In addition, activated PA
cannot be transferred across companies in the same group. The joint implications of
these rules are that: (1) the effectiveness of cross pad relief still depends on the
availability of sufficient income from an operator’s pool of pads, but without
recourse to group production income. It is thus still likely that an operator may not
receive all of its investments in unsuccessful pads even though it may have generated
production income and hence PA within its group of companies, and this rule could
be too restrictive; and (2) delayed activation of PA suggests potential accumulation
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of interest cost for, many years, at least 3 years. For smaller companies, this could 
prove burdensome, and although the benefits of RFES could mitigate such impact 
and likely create further investment incentive, RFES does not extend to PA. For early
investors in UK shale gas, the risk of unsuccessful pads is plausible due to
uncertainty surrounding the geological potential at the early stage.
In addition, for the purposes of PA, the definition of CAPEX is limited to 
expenditure that attracts 100% first year capital allowances. By extension, the
definition excludes incidental expenditures required to incur such qualifying
CAPEX. Further, unconventional oil and gas wells cost more to drill and deplete
faster (Kaiser 2012). Continuous drilling of new wells is thus required to maintain
production (Kaiser 2012). Consequently, incurring plug and abandonment costs on
existing lateral wells mid-life is a requirement in order to drill new ones. Currently,
such intermediate periodic expenditure is not covered by the allowance and it is
argued that this could potentially discourage investment at the initial exploration
phase of industry when geological potential has yet to be firmly established.
Although the government consultation recognised that it would have to redefine this 
later, we argue that by resolving this issue at the present time, further certainty could 
be introduced into the fiscal regime; by assuring certainty of tax  treatment, and boost
early investment.
In a response document to the UK government-public consultation on the
shale gas fiscal regime, a majority of respondents suggested that the PA increased the
attractiveness of economic but uncommercial projects (HM Treasury 2013) and
therefore acts as incentive for shale gas investment. Based on the findings of this
research and as Figure 9 shows, it is argued that the PA only partly achieves the
government’s intended incentives effects of PA. The regime very well taxes away
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economic rent as gas price increases, an evidence consistent with the response
received by the government in its public consultation (HM Treasury 2013), but offers
less and less protection to investors as gas price falls. In addition, there seem to be
excessive restrictions in the operational rules of PA that collectively negate its
incentive effects. This, we would like to name, a ‘Reverse Policy’ – one in which the
results are inconsistent with government motives. The policy, therefore, needs to be
reviewed with urgency in order to render shale gas investment more attractive to













Gas Price $/mmbtu 
Pre-Tax and Post-Tax IRR Sensitivity to Gas Price 
Pre-Fiscal IRR Post Fiscal IRR With Pad Allowance 
BA C 
Figure 9: Effects of Gas Price Changes and Pad Allowance on Investor Returns b
b Figure 9 Shows the relative balance of UK tax effects and also PA effects on investor returns. At
lower levels of gas price, all 3 curves almost converge at $3.1/ mmbtu (31 pence per therm). However,
as prices increase, the tax burden represented by the gap AB widens more than proportionately,
compared to the marginal operator returns represented by the gap BC, implying an imbalance of the
split of risk and reward between shale gas investors and the Government. A further test shows the
standard deviation of the slope for A, B and C returns 0.70, 0.90 and 0.88 respectively. The investor
returns (with PA [B] show the most variability). Thus, instead of stabilising investor returns, the
presence of the PA appears to introduce a higher variability of investor returns in response to natural
gas price changes. This is contrary to the recommended petroleum fiscal design principle of ‘stability’.
UK fracking is widely reported to be unprofitable at typical gas prices. For
instance, Bloomberg, in a report to the UK Parliament estimated that it will cost
between $7.10 and $12.20/ mmbtu to produce UK shale gas, whilst noting that spot
gas price was in the region of $8 to $11/ mmbtu (House of Lords 2013). The Oxford
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Institute for Energy Studies estimates the cost of extraction at $8 to $16/ mmcf; EY)
estimates at least $8 to $12/ mmbtu whilst Centrica estimates 46 to 66 pence per 
therm [equivalent to $0.46 to $0.66/ mmbtu3] (Boren 2015; Geny 2010; EY 2013). 
At the same time, these studies report the average natural gas price of less than 50
pence per therm ($5/ mmbtu). In Poland and Germany, EY reports a break even gas
price of $8 to $16/ mmcf (EY 2013). 
As noted earlier, the US government’s tax cuts of 2017 reduced corporate tax
rate from 35% to 21%. The tax cut came in recognition of the current market and
operational situation of oil and gas business (US Public Law 115-07-Dec. 22, 2017; 
US IRS 2018), and has resulted in reduced average effective tax rates for the 5 years 
ending December 31 2017 from negative 14% to positive 31% for some major
fracking companies as reported in Appendix 1. The direct response to the initiative
was a barrage of announcements of new investments in shale gas and tight oil by
major oil companies in the US, with ExxonMobil and Chevron alone pledging a total 
of nearly $40 billion investment in the Permian Basin - the US’s largest hub for shale 
gas and tight oil between 2018 and 2023 (FT 2018; CNBC 2018; CNBC 2018a;
OilPrice.Com 2018). It is worth noting that at the previous 35% corporate tax rate,
most fracking giants were reported to be struggling to cover their costs of operation
(Forbes 2018).
Table 8 presents a comparative account of selected unconventional oil and gas
producing countries and helps to place the discussion in perspective. As Table 8 
shows, there are broad similarities but also marked differences between the UK’s and
other fiscal regimes globally. For example, operators may carry forward losses (LCF)
indefinitely in the UK and Alberta, Canada and this is an encouraging feature of the
3 See Appendices 2 and 3 for conversion approach
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fiscal regime. In addition, exploration expenditures may be fully depreciated upon
incurring them, whilst the presence of PA and RFES allow UK companies additional 
deductions which are only found in the Algerian shale fiscal regime. Cost recovery
limit (CRL), known to prolong the PBP of investments, carried government 
participation interests, royalties, and other fiscal features that have been tagged
regressive are excluded in the UK fiscal regime. Together, these support the profit-
based tax approach of the fiscal regime.
Nonetheless, the UK has the highest definitive tax rate even though there is 
limited understanding of its resource potential as well as an uncertain fate of 
production. With 30% RFCT and 10% SC, UK tax is far above the tax rates of the
much successful North American shale oil and gas producers at 21%, well
progressing Chinese CBM and shale gas development at 25% and the much
successful Canadian tar sands and steadily progressing shale gas development. The
evidence thus suggests that the UK hopes to tax its fracking industry even more than
the much prolific US shale gas, and confirms an industry consultation feedback to the
government in 2013 that even with PA, an overall effective tax rate of 40% to 50%
would be payable by a company depending on the level set and that was very high.
Indeed, this appears to be very high compared to typical rates in the world’s biggest 
shale gas hub – US, and for the reason of the current market structure with low
prices, may not be a competitive or suitable fiscal regime to attract investment.
In addition, although UK compares favourably with best practice on the
depreciation of exploration costs, with 100% immediate write off, with its 25%
depreciation for P&M costs, it is likely that UK could be relatively at a competitive
disadvantage due to the application of RBB of depreciation (See Acquah-Andoh et 
al. 2019a).
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Table 8: Comparative Summary of Fiscal Regimes for Selected Shale Gas States
Parameter United Kingdom Pennsylvania Texas Alberta Saskatchewan Algeria China
Corporate
income tax rate








10% – 40%a 25%
Additional tax 
rate













10% RBB for mineral
extraction assets; 25%
RBB for P&M and 
long-life assets

















10% RFES (uplift of
Up to 100% PA could 
reduce effective tax to 
30%










N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A Oil 60%; gas 70%
Royalty N/A Oil 12.5%; gas
12.5%
Oil 20%; gas 20% Oil 0% - 5%;
gas 5%-36%a; 
0%-40%a 




Oil 11%; gas 11%
Additional
royalty
N/A $5k - $60K per well
for gas; N/A for oil
Oil 4.6%; gas 0%­
7.5%c 
N/A N/A N/A N/A
Guaranteed 
state share
N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A Min 5%; max 55%
State
participation
N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 51%d 51%
a varies with profitability ratio; b varies with oil price; c varies with cost of well; d carried interest until development with repayment; RBB – Reducing balance basis;
 
Straight line basis; IDC – Intangible drilling costs; P&M – Plant and machinery; N/A – Not applicable.
 
Source: Daniel 2017; EY (2019); US Public Law 115-07-Dec. 22, 2017; US IRS 2018)
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Whilst the US and China allow straight line methods of depreciation, over 5 to 8 
years for companies to recover their development costs, the UK allows 10%
depreciation on RBB for mineral extraction assets, an approach which undoubtedly
could defeat an accelerated depreciation policy. Although there are fewer fiscal
features in UK’s fiscal regime compared to China and Algeria, it is essential that the
UK’s fiscal policy is benchmarked against the more successful US policy for two
reasons: (1) its success with shale gas extraction; and (2) the similarity in geological
characteristics between US and UK shale formations (BGS-DECC 2014).
Clearly, the fiscal regime for shale gas has tenets of a LPFR in the sense its 
tax strategy targets shale gas income rather than revenues, via the PA, RFCT, SC and
RFES features. Nevertheless, the regime equally contains quasi proprietorial tax
features revealed through the implementation approach of the PA, and the high
overall effective tax, which ultimately kill the incentive (i.e. profits reflected in the
IRR in Figure 9) to invest and an amendment of the fiscal regime in general is
needed. The PA implementaion must be reviewed to allow the transfer of activated
PA across companies in the same group and the definition of CAPEX requires an
expansion to include mid-life well retirement costs necessary to drill new laterals to
stimulate production. Also, a removal of SC from the fiscal regime could potentially
simplify the tax regime by removing the distortion it causes to the operator after tax
cash flows without economic detriment to the state. Such single line taxation strategy
could render the regime more comparable to the practices in more successful
countries like the US, China, Algeria and Canada. Ultimately, a reduction in the
overall tax for shale gas from 40% to no more than the US rate of 21% is proposed.
This would seem reasonable for UK shale gas and could better reward operators
under the particular industry circumstances.
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5.0 Conclusion and Policy Implications
The UK is believed to hold prolific shale gas reserves. Nonetheless,
development progress has been noted to be slow with often cited environmental,
health concerns and protests blamed for the slow growth. Meanwhile, more than ten 
(10) years on, since the government’s offering of commercial licenses for shale gas 
exploration at its 13th Onshore Licensing Round in 2007, the fracking industry is said
to have benefited from only £400 million to £500 million investments, and only one
(partially) fracked well, with still no certainty yet, of the commercial potential of
fracking within UK. The current research focused beyond the often cited
environmental protests and planning/ permitting delays for the current fate of shale
gas development in UK and explored the likely impacts of the fiscal/ tax regime on
the practicality of investments in shale gas in UK. PA and RFES are important
features of the UK shale gas fiscal regime. The implications of these incentives as 
well as the relative burden of the RFCT regime was evaluated. We find that PA and
RFES only provide marginal cushioning support to fracking operators. At an average
EUR of 7.4 bcf per well, 22.5% higher than the UKOOG’s recent estimate of 5 bcf 
per well and 22% more than the average US (Marcellus) well recovery rate, shale gas
investments return unstable economics at typical gas prices, with most scenarios 
resulting in losses, whilst positive economics are characterised by a long PBP. It is
normal for shale gas exploitation projects to have longer PBP, and although the UK
Government recognises this situation, the tax incentives package included in the
shale gas fiscal regime does not appear to provide sufficient protection for shale gas
investments during weak price, low production, or high cost environments. At lower 
gas price, the tax regime appears to carry a moderate economic burden for operators 
but at the same time, fiscal incentives also appear to be almost non-existent and
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hence shale gas investments are not efficient over a wide range of realistic gas prices
up to $6.20/ mmbtu at a relatively very high EUR of 7.4 bcf per well. On the other
hand, at higher gas prices, the impact of the tax regime becomes quickly noticeable 
with progressively wider and higher tax costs to operators. 
By implication, although the philosophy behind the tax regime appears to
derive from profit based taxation principles, the tax approach seems to withdraw
support from the industry at lower gas prices at a time when industry would need
such support the most in order to survive. We also find that at higher gas prices,
operator profits are quickly taxed off more than proportionately from price increases.
This mechanism  introduces risks to the fiscal regime. As the UK is only an emerging 
shale gas developer with higher risks around commercial production, Brexit,
environmental protests, and more recently seismology challenges, amongst others,
we argue that the current fiscal regime appears risky, and less attractive, for 
investment in shale gas. It is thus likely that UK may have lost potential investments 
as a result of the fiscal regime and it could lose further investor interests with the
current configuration of its fiscal regime for shale gas, especially the delivery of PA.
Although the PA contained within the fiscal regime has been well received by
the industry, the same PA has provoked some concerns about its implementation,
importantly on how losses from non-performing pads may be recovered by a
company or group of companies. Generated PA cannot be transferred across
companies in the same group; PA can only be activated three years from the time of
investment; RFES does not extend to PA and CAPEX definition excludes mid-life
asset retimrement costs required to incur qualifying CAPEX, among other
restrictions. In effect, the collective impact of these restrictions appear to negate the
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incentive effect of PA. In this research, we also find an unfair balance of risk-reward
sharing between government and operators within the nascent fracking industry.
The current study evaluated the economic impacts of the UK fiscal regime for 
shale gas. In addition, it examined the extent of risk–reward sharing between shale
gas investors and the UK Government as implied by the shale gas fiscal regime and
uncovers an uneven distribution of the risks of developing shale gas as well as the
division of profits amongst the Government and industry. Overall, a reduced
effective tax rate from 40% to 21% is proposed. In addition, it is recommended that
additional tax charges, the SC, be removed from the fiscal regime and PA rules be
amended to extend RFES benefits to PA, and allow intercompany transfer of 
activated PA within the same group in order to better guarantee availability of the
allowance. Essentially, a refocused government fiscal strategy which drives more 
and more investments at the early and relatively riskier stage of industry would be an
optimal strategy for the UK government. This approach is practically true for similar 
emerging countries in Europe and elsewhere that wish to develop their
unconventional oil and gas resources.
This study was limited to economic impact analysis of the fiscal regime for 
shale gas. Future research could survey industry operators and service providers for
information on their confidence in the fiscal regime to offer first-hand information to 
corroborate the findings of this research. In addition, further research that attempts to
model fiscal scenarios that better distribute risks and rewards of developing shale gas 
fairly would support the UK Government’s efforts to stimulate investment in shale 
gas development.
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